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The Guns of Sicily
The 1st Canadian Divisional
Artillery in Operation Husky

DAVID

W. G R E B S T A D

Abstract: Most studies on Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, focus
almost exclusively on the work of the manoeuvre elements with only
perfunctory references to the men who provided the fire support. The story
of the Canadian gunners that fought their way through Sicily has been
woefully overlooked and needs to be told. Amongst the hills of Sicily, these
Canadian gunners overcame inexperience, intense heat, forbidding terrain
and a resilient enemy to develop the war-winning fire support formula that
would later allow the Canadian Army to successfully fight its way through
Italy and Northwest Europe.

Dieppe raid, the campaign in Sicily was the first
divisional-level combat operation conducted by the Canadian
Arm y during the Second World War. During this operation, the
future leaders of the Canadian Arm y in North-West Europe developed
their combat experience and refined the fighting methods that
would eventually lead them to victory.1 Any work that investigates
Operation Husky focuses almost exclusively on the work of the
manoeuvre element with only perfunctory references to the men who
provided the fire support. The story of the gunners that fought their
way through Sicily needs to be told. Amongst the hills of Sicily, these
Canadian gunners developed the war-winning formula that would

O
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1 Mark Zuehlke, Operation Husky: The Canadian Invasion of Sicily, July 10-August
7, 1943 (Vancouver: Douglas and Macintyre, 2008), 2.
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allow the Canadian Army to fight its way through Italy and North
West Europe. The intent of this article is to shed some light on the
formidable efforts of the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery during the
Sicilian campaign in the summer of 1943.

OVERVIEW

A review of the strategic impetus behind the invasion of Sicily, and
the machinations that brought 1st Canadian Infantry Division into
the operation late in the preparations, is beyond the scope of this
article. It is sufficient to say that in the spring of 1943, 1st Canadian
Division was ordered to conduct operations in Sicily commencing
on 10 July 1943. The division’s commander royal artillery (c r a )
was Brigadier Bruce Matthews.23
4 The 1st Canadian Divisional
Artillery for the operations in Sicily comprised A and C Batteries
of the 1st Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (r c h a ),3
the 2nd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery (r c a ), the 3rd
Field Regiment, r c a , the 1st Anti-Tank Regiment, r c a and the 2nd
Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, r c a . Also under command for the
initial assault was the 142nd (Royal Devon Yeomanry) Regiment
Self-Propelled (s p ), Royal Artillery (r a ) and the 93rd (Medium)
Battery, r a .4 These two British artillery units proved invaluable to
the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery. The Devons were equipped
with Bishop 25-pounder self-propelled howitzers and thus had
substantially greater mobility than the towed guns in the Canadian
units. Furthermore, the long-range medium guns (5.5-inch howitzers)
of 93rd (Medium) Battery could engage more distant targets than
the 25-pounders.
The months leading up to the invasion were filled with intensive
training and planning in Scotland. The division’s move to the

2 The CRA commanded all of the artillery assigned to the Division, including Field,
Medium, Anti-Tank and Anti-Aircraft Artillery. It was the C R A ’s duty to coordinate
the fire of these units, along with supporting fire from naval vessels, close support
aircraft and bombers, all with a view to facilitating the Division Commander’s
manoeuvre plan.
3 1st Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery comprised three gun batteries
- A, B and C. Due to space limitations only A and C Battery deployed to Sicily. B
Battery joined its parent regiment in Italy after the Sicilian campaign.
4 Headquarters Royal Canadian Artillery, 1st Canadian Division [HQ RCA 1st Cdn
Div], Operation Order No.1, 6.
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Gunners drill in Canada before being sent overseas in 1940. [Laurier Centre for Military Strategic
and Disarmament Studies]

Mediterranean involved a torturous voyage from Scotland to the
south-eastern tip of Sicily. En route, three ships were sunk by a
German U-boat resulting in vehicles, communication equipment,
and artillery pieces being sent to the ocean floor. Despite this set
back, the 1st Canadian Division landed on the beaches near Pachino
during the early morning hours of 10 July 1943. The division formed
the extreme left (western) flank of both 30 Corps and Eighth (UK)
Army commanded by General Bernard Montgomery, and was flanked
further to the West by Seventh (US) Army, under General George
Patton. Together, Seventh and Eighth Armies comprised the Fifteenth
Army Group commanded by British General Harold Alexander.
The division’s initial advances were rapid as the defenders
withdrew northward under pressure towards more defensible ground,
centered on the southern slope of Mount Etna. There the Germans
and Italians exploited Sicily’s rugged terrain to its fullest. The result
was several weeks of hard fighting during which the Canadians
literally had to blast the defenders out of successive ridge lines. After
about a month of intense combat, the Allies forced the Germans to
evacuate the island and withdraw across the straits of Messina onto
mainland Italy.
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UNBLOODED ARTILLERY

Almost all of the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery had been on the
first “flight” of combat elements that left Canada in 1939. They
spent the next three-and-half years conducting extensive training in
the United Kingdom - initially to repel the anticipated invasion of
Britain by the Germans, and then in preparation for the eventual
return to the continent. W ith the exception of a brief foray to France
in 1940, the units did not see combat, and thus were completely
“green” when they landed in Sicily. The Canadians were among
British and American formations who had recently shattered the
Axis forces in North Africa, proving themselves in combat and
acquiring new tactics, techniques, and procedures.
The Canadian Arm y that arrived in England in 1939 was trained
to fight a war along the same lines as their British counterparts.
The doctrine of the time spurned the terrors of attritional warfare
that had dominated the First World War and featured a nearly
blind commitment to breakthrough by manoeuvre.5 In the early
years of the war, the key leaders of the British Arm y conducted
exercises predicated on deep penetration and were dismissive of the
requirement for concentrated fire support.6 This approach to battle
survived the operational-level failures of France in 1940 and pervaded
Allied thinking even up to the commencement of the North Africa
Campaign. It was in the sands of Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia that the
artillery would re-emerge as the predominant arm on the battlefield.
Chased into Egypt by Rommel’s Afrika Korps, it was not until the
British built up significant artillery that they were able to stop the
German advance with massive artillery fires, and commence offensive
operations. The Allied predilection for deep manoeuvre was replaced
by a return to an artillery-based doctrine like that of the First World
War, predicated on a deliberate assault behind barrages by massed
artillery.7 This artillery-based doctrine that emerged from the deserts

5 John Mosier, The Blitzkrieg Myth (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 10.
6 Terry Copp, The Brigade: The Fifth Canadian Infantry Brigade in WWII
(Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2007), 32.
7 Major-General (Retired) J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 2004), 297. While there were a number of derivations of
barrages, in essence a barrage was a wall of artillery fire that would “lift” or move a
prescribed rate in accordance with the estimated speed of advance of the attacking
manoeuvre formations.
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A Canadian anti-tank regiment training in England prior to the Sicily invasion. [Library and
Archives Canada PA 142661]

of North Africa was quite foreign to the British - and therefore,
Canadian - generals of 1942.8
The evolving doctrine forced a change in organization and
attitude. Late 1942 and 1943 saw a wholesale centralization of artillery
where previously doctrine had stressed decentralization. In the fall of
1942, General Bernard Montgomery, commander of Eighth Army,
ordered that “the Divisional C R A [was to] have centralized command
of their divisional artillery, which was to be used as a seventy-twogun battery.”910 In September 1942, in another step towards the
centralization of fire support, the British Arm y created the first
Army Group Royal Artillery (a g r a ) 10 in which medium and field
regiments were brigaded. Although nominally an army-level asset, in
practice the a g r a was often allocated to a corps. Canada followed
suit and created 1st Canadian a g r a in October 1942. The ability to
concentrate overwhelming fires that resulted from the creation of the
a g r a s was one of the major factors that led to final victory.11

8 Copp, The Brigade, 32.
9 Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, 306.
10 Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, 72.
11 G.W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: A History of the Royal Regiment
of Canadian Artillery, Volume II: 1919-1967 (Toronto : McClelland and Stewart,
1972), 111.
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Although the 1st Canadian Division and its artillery had been
training together for nearly three years, in the 12 months leading
up to the invasion of Sicily the doctrine for the organization and
employment of divisional artillery changed wholesale. As a result, the
Canadian gunners under their c r a , Brigadier Bruce Matthews, found
themselves racing to catch up.

ORDERS FOR AN INVASION

The spring of 1943 brought orders for the 1st Canadian Division,
commanded by Major-General G uy Granville Simonds, to
participate in Operation Husky and mission-specific training began
on 1 May 1943, only seventy days before D-Day.12 Although they
were still trying to familiarize themselves with the artillery-based
doctrine that had emerged from the North Africa Campaign, the
Canadian gunners’ training was further hampered by a large-scale
change in their equipment. All of the 25-pounder howitzers were
fitted with new muzzle-brakes, while the Field Artillery Tractors
( f a t s ) that towed the guns were replaced by new four-wheel drive
variants known as Quads. New wireless sets were also issued, and
the anti-tank artillery regiment converted one troop per battery
to the heavy new 17-pounder anti-tank guns.13 In an after-action
review of the events leading up to the operation, Brigadier Matthews
recalled that the major equipment changes “were a great problem
to all units, and coupled with the hundreds of minor adjustments
to equipment of all sorts, tended to make things rather chaotic and
seriously affected training in all departments.”14 Despite the change
in doctrine and equipment, the gunners successfully completed
several weeks of intensive training in Scotland in preparation for
the invasion. Training was facilitated by mentorship provided by
an artillery veteran of the North Africa campaign, Eighth Arm y’s
brigadier royal artillery ( b r a ) , Brigadier Meade E. Dennis. He, along

12 Originally the Division had been under the command of Major-General Harry
Salmon. While travelling to Cairo for a coordination conference prior to Husky,
General Salmon was killed in an air crash. General Simonds was commanding 2nd
Canadian Division at the time, and was transferred to command of 1st Canadian
Division to replace Salmon.
13 HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Summary of Events Leading Up to Operations by 1 Cdn Div, 3.
14 HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Summary of Events Leading Up to Operations by 1 Cdn Div, 3.
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A
Canadian
anti-tank
regiment
training in England prior to the Sicily
invasion. [Canadian Forces Photo ZK 572]

with other British veterans of North Africa, had been dispatched by
Montgomery to assist the Canadians in preparing for combat.15
The first convoy of ships departed Scotland on 28 June 1943 with
the remainder following at regular intervals.16 The last element of
the Divisional Artillery, the 1st Regiment, r c h a , departed Gourrock
Harbour aboard the s s Arundel on 1 July. Tension must have been
high amongst the members of the 1st Regiment as they were ordered
to carry life preservers at all times and sleep fully clothed.17
As the gunners sailed away, the 1st Canadian Divisional
Artillery’s war diarist noted contemplatively that “all ranks [watched]
Scotland fade behind us and Ireland looming ahead. Most of us
watched the same sight in reverse order three and a half years ago.”18
Aboard the headquarters ship, the Hillary, Brigadier Matthews
lectured the Divisional Artillery Headquarters on “Artillery Aspects
of the Operation” and a Captain Arnold briefed the troops aboard

15
16
17
18

Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, Vol.II, 135.
War Diary [WD], 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery [1st Cdn Div Arty], 28 June 1943.
WD, 1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery [1 RCHA], 1 July 1943.
WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 28 June 1943.
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on elementary Italian.19 Amongst the other units of the Divisional
Artillery, the routine consisted of lectures, physical training, and in
the case of the 1st Regiment, r c h a a route march aboard the ship.20
Soon after the convoy entered the Mediterranean, the first tragedy of
the Sicilian campaign struck the division. U-boats sank three ships
- the City of Venice, the St. Eseylt, and the Devis - on 4 July.21
While all units of the 1st Canadian Division suffered materially from
this loss, the Divisional Artillery was particularly hard hit. It lost
eight 17-pounder anti-tank guns, 10 25-pounder howitzers and six
40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns, and almost all of the vehicles of
the Divisional Artillery Headquarters, although Brigadier Matthews’
office caravan was spared.22 The preponderance of lost equipment
came from the 3rd Field Regiment, r c a , and specifically 92 Battery.
The 3rd Regiment’s diarist lamented that “it was rather a disastrous
loss for the [Regiment] as G section lost all their wireless sets and one
of our three [batteries] was practically eliminated before the operation
had even started.”23 This exacerbated the existing shortages, as the
division was already short of its normal complement of fire support
assets. The 1st Regiment, r c h a was left behind to join the Divisional
Artillery on a later convoy, and when it deployed, it only brought two
batteries.24 As a result of losing these vessels, 3rd Field Regiment was
compelled to organize itself on a two - rather than three - battery
basis.25 Likewise, 2nd Field Regiment lost an entire troop of personnel
when their ship was torpedoed and they were taken to Algiers by a
rescue ship, not to rejoin the regiment for seven weeks.26 Considering
the importance of artillery support to the prevailing Allied doctrine
after the North Africa campaign, the loss of these fire support assets
was a major blow to the division’s ability to execute operations.

19 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 2-3 July 1943.
20 WD, 1 RCHA, 5 July 1943.
21 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 4 July 1943.
22 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 5 July 1943.
23 WD, 3rd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery [3 RCA], 1-9 July 1943.
24 Major G.D. Mitchell, Lieutenant-Colonel B.A. Reid, Lieutenant-Colonel W.
Simcock, RCHA - Right of the Line: An Anecdotal History of the Royal Canadian
Horse Artillery from 1871 (Ottawa: RCHA History Committee, 1986), 95.
25 WD, 3 RCA, 1-9 July 1943.
26 Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, Vol.II, 139.
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AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT AND THE FIGHT INLAND

The fire support plan that Brigadier Matthews developed for the
assault phase of the campaign was rather straightforward. As the
schedule did not have batteries coming ashore until last light on
D-Day, fire support for the amphibious assault was initially provided
by naval gunfire. The organic artillery would be available to support
operations once they had established themselves on shore.
Matthews’ plan for the assault phase decentralized the artillery in
direct support of the two assault brigades, the 1st and 2nd Canadian
Infantry Brigades. Each assaulting brigade could expect fire support
from a battery and a half of self-propelled howitzers from the Devons,
and a field regiment of towed 25-pounders.27 The first artillery gun
groups scheduled to arrive on the beach came from the Devons,
divided into two groups of a battery and a half each. The Devons were
followed by the guns of the 2nd and 3rd Field Regiments, r c a tasked
to support 1st and 2nd Brigades, respectively.28 The 1st Regiment,
r c h a eventually came ashore on 13 July.29 Consistent with the lessons
learned in North Africa and changes in doctrine that stressed the
centralization of artillery, all fire units were ordered to deploy as close
as possible to the inter-brigade boundary in order to facilitate their
centralization under the c r a after the assault phase was over.30 The
1st Regiment, r c h a would either land and be directed to an assembly
area or fall under command of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade,
depending on the situation at the time.313
2
Ammunition conservation was a grave concern. Once ashore,
each regiment was authorized to fire up to 50 percent of its daily
authorized ammunition allocation. Any firing beyond the 50 percent
amount required the approval of the c r a .32 For the first six days
of operations, the 25-pounders were authorized to fire 63 rounds
per gun, per day while the medium guns were authorized 50. After
six days that number was halved.33 Despite these planning figures,

27
28
29
30
31
32
33

HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Operation
HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Operation
WD, 1 RCHA, 13 July 1943.
HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Operation
HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Operation
HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Operation
HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Operation

Order No.1, 5.
Order No.1, 5.
Order
Order
Order
Order
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as it became harder to overcome German defences, the amount of
ammunition that was expended increased exponentially.
The allocation of artillery observers to the assaulting brigades
followed normal protocol, with the exception of the establishment of a
Bombardment Unit of eight Ships’ Forward Observation Officer (f o o )
Parties that were created from the existing artillery f o o parties. These
units were attached to each of the four assault battalions, the two
Royal Marines commandos (40 and 41 Commando) and the reserve
brigade.34 The f o o s of the Bombardment Units had received special
training at the Combined Operations Training Centre in Scotland
prior to the invasion. The parties were a mix of regular artillery and
naval personnel with additional radio equipment to allow them to
communicate with the fire support vessels.35 These f o o s would often
operate well ahead of the infantry battalions they were supporting.
In one instance, George “Duff” Mitchell, assigned to the Princess
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (p p c l i ), was provided with a Bren
carrier and a small protection party.36 Mitchell experienced difficulty
with communications using the notorious No.18 Set radio, so he was
very happy to have the more dependable No.22 Set that came with
the Bren carrier. The No.22 Set enabled his signaller to establish
communications with the h m s Delhi from which he directed a short
barrage at the town of Ispica.37
The Delhi was just one vessel of a large armada that provided
naval fire support during the amphibious assault. Warships on call in
the Canadian area of operations included two monitors, five gunboats,
nine landing craft gun (large), six landing craft tank (rocket), and
eight landing craft flak.38 Particularly effective were the massive
15-inch guns of the monitor h m s Roberts.39 The pulverizing fire of
the Roberts’ 879-kilogram shells facilitated the quick and efficient
capture of the towns of Ispica, Modica and Ragusa. It was from
Roberts that the c r a , who had left the headquarters ship Hilary,

34 HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Operation Order No.1, 8.
35 George (Duff) Mitchell, interview by Quiller Graham, 28 November 2000,
Canadian War Museum Oral History Project, 31D Mitchell 1, Ottawa, ON.
36 Mitchell interview.
37 Mitchell interview.
38 Directorate of History and Heritage, Canadian Military Headquarters [CMHQ]
Report 126: Canadian Operations in Sicily, July-August 1943: Part I: The
Preliminaries of Operation Husky, 23, < http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhhdhp/his/rep-rap/cmhqrd-drqgmc-eng.asp?txtType=2&RfId=126>.
39 Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, Vol.II, 140.
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directed the bombardment of the Sicilian littoral as the assaulting
troops moved inland.40 The first shore bombardment by this vessel
occurred at 1530 hours on 10 July in the vicinity of Ispica. The war
diary dryly describes the fire as simply “effective.”41
The landings were generally unopposed but did not go smoothly
for the artillery. A storm passed through the area on 9 July resulting
in high seas. The roiling surf posed a number of challenges for the
gunners waiting to disembark. The 2nd Field Regiment’s war diarist
recalled that “a feeling of excitement prevailed among the troops
except the few who were seasick.”42
In accordance with the plan, the first artillery elements landed
were the self-propelled guns of the Devons who reported themselves
established ashore at 1730 hours.43 The Devons even captured 300
Italian prisoners of war their first day ashore.44The Divisional Artillery
Headquarters landed on 11 July, moved north on the morning of 12
July, but suffered immensely in mobility due to its lack of vehicles.
As the headquarters staff moved out, a flight of six German aircraft
strafed its column. Gunner Howard Schultz, on loan to the Divisional
Artillery Headquarters from the 1st Field Regiment, r c h a was killed
and became the first fatal Canadian gunner casualty in Sicily.
Early on 11 July the troops of the 3rd Field Regiment assembled
on the decks of their ship at 0230 hours and then waited for two
to three hours before finally boarding a landing craft.45 Once they
reached the shore, the troops moved inland on foot to assembly areas,
where they awaited the arrival of their guns and vehicles. The logic of
employing a self-propelled regiment in support of the assault brigades
became evident when many of the towed-artillery’s Quads became
stuck in the loose sand and had to be towed to firm ground.46
A ll of the guns and vehicles of 2nd and 3rd Regiments, r c a had
been delivered on shore by 11 July.47 Once the artillery began its

40 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 10 July 1943.
41 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 10 July 1943.
42 WD, 2nd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery [2 RCA], 9 July 1943.
43 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 10 July 1943.
44 Directorate of History and Heritage, CMHQ Report 127: Canadian Operations in
Sicily, July-August 1943: Part II: The Execution of the Operation by 1 Cdn Inf Div.
Section 1: The Assault and Initial Penetration Inland, 10, <http:/ /www.cmp-cpm.forces.
gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/cm hqrd-drqgm c-eng.asp?txtType=2&RfId=127>.
45 w D, 3 RCA, 10 July 1943.
46 WD, 2 RCA, 10 July 1943.
47 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 11-12 July 1943.
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move inland, the towed 25-pounder howitzers had a difficult time
moving on the goat-trails that passed for roads in southern Sicily.
This would be a constant theme throughout the Sicilian campaign,
and mobility was a particular problem for the 3rd Field Regiment
which had lost so many vehicles to the U-boat attack. The 3rd Field
Regiment tried a number of schemes to overcome its equipment
shortages. On 11 July the regiment took control of four Italian 4.5inch howitzers complete with horses, harnesses, ammunition and
wagons. Although the regimental sergeant-major made a valiant
attempt to press these assets into service, in the end the scheme was
abandoned as the rate of advance was too slow and the gunners who
“volunteered” as horse drivers complained of saddle sores.48 Later, the
3rd Regiment dispatched some personnel to try to augment the unit’s
meagre transportation. The party returned with a Fiat passenger car
that had been employed by the Italian Army, a 3-ton diesel truck,
and another early vintage Fiat passenger car.49 These vehicles gave
the 3rd Field Regiment a rather motley appearance, but the gunners’
commitment to execute their mission is commendable. The 3rd Field
Regiment’s war diarist observed “how we move is a wonder to all of
us. Men are hanging onto vehicles everywhere - on the tops, on the
sides, and the [Regiment] bears more resemblance to a circus than
to a Regiment of Field Artillery.”50 This poor state of affairs led to
the unit’s first casualty of the campaign. Lance-Sergeant Jack of 19
Battery, while clinging to the top of a Quad, was knocked off by a
wire strung across the road and subsequently crushed by the gun
and limber being towed behind. The unfortunate lance-sergeant died
before the medical officer could reach him.51
Jack’s death took place while the field artillery was rushing forward
to try to keep within range of the rapidly withdrawing defenders.
Naval gunfire was thus vital during the first days. In fact, the first
“Canadian” rounds were fired on 12 July by the 142nd (Royal Devon
Yeomanry) Regiment (s p ), r a whose self-propelled guns had greater
mobility on the precarious Sicilian roads. The capture of the town of
Modica by the p p c l i was facilitated by a 15-minute barrage by the

48
49
50
51
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WD,
WD,
WD,
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3
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Devon’s that expended 575 high explosive rounds.52 The 2nd and 3rd
Field Regiments, r c a did not fire their first rounds until 14 July,
while 1st Field Regiment, r c h a did not join the fight until 17 July.53
The lack of engagement was less than satisfactory to the gunners of
the 3rd Field Regiment. On 12 July the regiment’s diarist bemoaned
that “to date the [Regiment] has not fired a shot!” and the next day,
even more exasperated, he wrote “and we still haven’t fired a round
from our guns. W ill we ever catch up to the Italians?”54
What caused this rapid withdrawal in front of the Allied
advance? Lee Windsor, in a recent publication, concluded that the
hasty northward withdrawal was in fact the result of a pragmatic
appreciation. When it became clear that the Allies would attempt
a landing somewhere in the Mediterranean, the Axis powers faced
a dilemma that is common to all armies on the defensive - much to
defend with insufficient forces.55 When the Allies landed on 10 July,
the Axis only had sufficient local forces to strike at the Americans at
Gela,56 and these counterattacks were broken by the 1st US Division
as it moved inland. Hitler, however, was determined to hang on
in Sicily, which he hoped would prevent Benito Mussolini’s fascist
government from falling and thus keep the Italians in the war on
the side of the Axis powers.57 Given the resources available and the
terrain, the Axis powers decided to establish a defensive line running
from San Stefano on the northern coast, south to Leonforte and
then east to Catania, creating an L-shaped perimeter that would
secure the northeast corner of Sicily.58 The apparent German and
Italian fighting retreat was in reality a deliberate withdrawal to a
more advantageous defensive position.
Thinking that the Axis powers were in retreat, Montgomery
issued orders for Eighth Arm y to advance quickly to the north. The
13th Corps pushed north towards the Catania plain, while 30th Corps
moved northwest towards Vizzini. At the vanguard of the 30th Corps
manoeuvre was an ad hoc armoured column known as Harpoon Force,

52 CMHQ Report 127, 17.
53 Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, Vol.II, 145-146.
54 WD, 3 RCA, 12-13 July 1943.
55 Lee Windsor, “The Eyes of All Fixed on Sicily, Canada’s Unexpected Victory,
1943,” Canadian Military History 22, no.3 (Summer 2013): 9.
56 Windsor, “The Eyes of All,” 10.
57 Windsor, “The Eyes of All,” 13.
58 Windsor, “The Eyes of All,” 12.
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followed closely by the 51st Highland Division. Montgomery hoped
these formations could move in behind the Axis forces opposing the
1st US Division at Gela and cut them off, but unfortunately the
30th Corps ran into elements of the Italian 54th Napoli Division
and the 206th Costal Division supported by elements of the German
Hermann Goering Division in Vizzini. W hat was intended to be a
bold turning manoeuvre became a sharply contested affair.59
The fight for Vizzini was the first major firing programme
undertaken primarily by the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery.
The surprisingly difficult fight for Vizzini brought Montgomery to
order Harpoon Force and 51st Highland Division to abandon the
northwesterly thrust and turn north towards the Catania plain, while
the US forces swung to the west. This left a sizeable gap between
the British and American forces that needed to be filled, and the 1st
Canadian Division was the only formation in position to do so.60

VALGUARNERA AND BEYOND

To fill the gap between the Seventh US and Eighth British Armies,
the 1st Canadian Division was ordered to move towards the town
of Enna. En route, the division ran into a rearguard force in Piazza
Armerina which held them up for nine hours. The Canadians had
run into the eastern flank of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division
who had established a defensive position to the south and west of
Enna in an effort to buy time for the 12th Italian Corps to move
into the northern branch of the defensive line from San Stefano to
Leonforte.61 After the Axis forces withdrew, the Canadians advanced
to the area of Valguarnera, where the enemy had dug in along high
ground with excellent command of the Catania plain. Assuming the
enemy they encountered were withdrawing elements of the Herman
Goering Division, 1st Canadian Division made a quick assault from
the line of march. This initial attempt failed, and, on 18 July, the
Canadians launched their first two-brigade assault on a road junction
near the town of Valguarnera.

59 Windsor, “The Eyes of All,” 13.
60 Windsor, “The Eyes of All,” 14.
61 Windsor, “The Eyes of All,” 19.
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The battle for Valguarnera represented a transformation of the
Sicilian campaign from a rapid advance behind a withdrawing foe
to a gritty struggle against a determined enemy dug in amongst the
rocky hills.62 The Canadians had in fact run into the hinge of the
defensive line where the Axis forces intended to hold the northeast
corner of the island. The Canadian divisional artillery now played a
sustained part in the combat operations.
The fire plan to support the attack on Valguarnera included all
of the regiments of the divisional artillery, less the 142nd (Royal
Devon Yeomanry) Regiment, r a but augmented by fire from the
7th Medium Regiment, r a . The c r a ’ s fire plan called for 68 rounds
per gun to be fired, for a total of 5,984 shells.63 This was the first
Canadian concentrated divisional fire mission in combat since the
First World War. After bitter fighting, the attack succeeded in
ejecting the German defenders from the road junction and seizing the
town of Valguarnera.

LEONFORTE/ ASSORO

The Canadians encountered similar resistance to the east in the
Catania plain. Montgomery’s plan for a dash up the east coast to
Messina was not coming to fruition. In a bit of classical British
understatement he described the increasing enemy resistance as
making things a “bit slow and sticky on the right.”64 While the 1st
Canadian Division was fighting around Valguarnera, the Germans
counterattacked the 13th Corps on the Catania Plain and in the
west ; the Americans who had swung wide to clear as far north as
Palermo, were still a week away from closing with the enemy to the
north. The only formation that had any potential to strike at a weak
point was the 1st Canadian Division.65 As a result the Canadians
were tasked to advance north to Leonforte and then move east into
the flank of the Germans, hopefully relieving the pressure on the
Catania plain.

62 CMHQ Report 127, 28.
63 WD, 1 RCHA, 18 July 1943.
64 General Bernard Montgomery quoted by C.P. Stacey in The Canadian Army
1939-1945: An Official Historical Summary (Ottawa: Ministry of National Defence,
1948), 104.
65 Lee Windsor, “The Eyes of All,” 25.
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The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (“Hasty P ’s”) were
tasked to seize the town of Assoro on the high ground to the east
of Leonforte. This manoeuvre aimed to support a later assault on
Leonforte by the 3rd Canadian Brigade. During the night of 20/21
July, the Hasty P ’s conducted a daring night-time ascent up a cliff
face and surprised the German garrison that occupied the ruins of
a Norman-era fort atop the hill. The Hasty P ’s coup de main has
attained legendary status, due in no small part to the participation
of eminent Canadian author Farley Mowat, who was an officer of the
unit. Less well-known, however, is the four-hour harassing fire plan
directed onto the road between Leonforte and Assoro that effectively
distracted the German defenders.66
The initial attempt to take Leonforte by 3rd Brigade ended in
failure. It involved no fire support and was a poorly planned attempt
to seize Leonforte in daylight.67 For the second attack on Leonforte,
Simonds employed the entire divisional artillery, reinforced by flanking
artillery units for the heaviest Canadian barrage of the campaign up
to that point. The intent of the barrage was to level the town of
Leonforte.68 The barrage, complemented by excellent counter-battery
fire directed from the heights of Assoro by a Hasty P officer who
had previously served in the artillery, allowed 3rd Brigade to secure
Leonforte. The efficacy of the massive barrage became apparent
several days later when the 2nd Field Regiment moved through the
Leonforte/Assoro area and noted in its war diary that the town was
completely ruined and the air was heavy with the odour of decayed flesh.69
As the British divisions in the east had to build up supplies for
their own renewed offensive Operation Hardgate, which began just
before midnight of 29-30 July, the 1st Canadian Division became the
main effort of Fifteenth Army Group.70 Once Leonforte and Assoro
were in Canadian hands, the division began an eastward move
toward the town of Agira in order to attack the flank of the German
defensive line on the Catania plain.71
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AGIRA

Simonds ordered an advance by 1st Canadian Brigade, led by the
Royal Canadian Regiment and the 48th Highlanders, from the
Leonforte/Assoro area eastward eight miles to the mountain-top
town of Agira. Until this point, the Axis forces had been deployed in
dispersed strong points. As they withdrew eastward under pressure
from the 1st Canadian Division, however, they benefitted from
contracting interior lines of communication and were able to deploy
into mutually supporting defensive positions.72
The attack was to commence at 1500 hours on 24 July. Simonds
knew that it would require a prodigious amount of firepower to dislodge
the defenders. The fire plan for the attack was conducted under the
supervision of no less than the commander corps royal artillery (c c r a )
of 30th Corps. The c c r a met with all of the commanding officers of
the Canadian divisional artillery at the latter’s headquarters on the
morning of 24 July to coordinate the fire support plan. The fire plan
consisted of a rolling barrage provided by seven regiments - those of
1st Canadian Divisional Artillery reinforced by 142nd (Royal Devon
Yeomanry) (s p ), r a , the 16th Field Regiment, r a , and the 7th and
64th Medium Regiments, r a from 30th Corps’ 5th a g r a . In addition
to artillery fire support, the division also received support from the
tactical and strategic air forces. During the fire plan conference, the
c c r a advised the artillery commanders that they would be witness
to the first example of cooperation between heavy bombers and land
forces, as the fire plan would include six squadrons of medium and
heavy bombers based in Malta.73
The complex fire plan included a number of moving pieces. In
order to help coordinate the air support, the 1st Field Regiment fired
a smoke screen 1000 metres ahead of the attacking infantry, beyond
which the air force was free to bomb targets of opportunity.74 Ahead
of the advancing infantry, a creeping barrage fired by the remaining
artillery units attempted to suppress the German defenders while
the assaulting battalions closed with them.75 Unfortunately, the rigid
schedule of the fire plan meant the barrage, which rolled forward in
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accordance with its timed programme, passed on when the infantry
were held up by enemy fire, thereby squandering its neutralization
effects. The 1st Canadian Brigade made three attempts to move
through the intervening town of Nissoria towards Agira, but in each
case the lead battalion was beaten back. Tragedy was narrowly
averted when the Divisional Artillery Headquarters issued orders for
the commanding officer of the 3rd Field Regiment to rendezvous
with the c r a , and transmitted the incorrect coordinates, which sent
the commanding officer and his intelligence officer into the as-yet
unsecured Nissoria. The two officers spent an “exceedingly unpleasant
hour in Nissoria awaiting the c r a ” before the error was realized and
the two made a hasty withdrawal to the heights of Assoro, the true
site of the meeting.76
The task of securing Agira passed from the tired 1st Brigade to
the 2nd Brigade. The c r a and artillery commanding officers met
with Simonds at an observation post atop Assoro.77 All reinforcing
regiments but 7th (Medium) Regiment, r a had been clawed back by
the c c r a of 30th Corps, so the number of rounds to be fired was
increased to 139 rounds per gun.78 The second fire plan opened with
a 17-minute barrage on the opening line. The barrage would then be
lifted and move eastward in 28 successive steps, advancing 100 yards
every 3 minutes.79
It is important to recognize the extraordinary efforts of the Royal
Canadian Arm y Service Corps. Although 139 rounds were called for
in the fire plan, Simonds ordered 400 rounds-per-gun to be delivered
to the gun positions.80 This required 150 trucks and drivers to haul
the ammunition from the beaches under what the war diarist of the
2nd Field Regiment described as “ [the] most adverse conditions.”81
As over 500 trucks of the division were lost on the three ships that
were sunk whilst en route to Sicily, the successful delivery of this
ammunition was a signal achievement.82
Throughout the battle for Agira, the guns were pushed well
forward, often deploying less than 3,000 yards from the forward
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infantry forces. In the fluid battlespace of Sicily, the gun positions
came under intermittent fire from enemy machine guns and heavy
mortars. On one occasion a German sniper became active off the
left flank of the 1st Field Regiment, r c h a , but withdrew after a
patrol was dispatched from the guns.83 Despite these challenges, the
fire plan to support the infantry past Nissoria was effective. The
divisional artillery war diarist reported that 2nd Canadian Infantry
Brigade:
made the attack under cover of barrage, which was reported by the
infantry to be perfect. The barrage was so even and steady that the
infantry closed right up on it and were on the enemy before they
recovered from shock of barrage. Prisoners taken confirm this view. The
objective ... was taken with very few casualties to our troops.84

Still, the day was not without tragedy. The 2nd Field Regiment, r c a
was shelled by German artillery and suffered 13 casualties.85
The lead elements of the division now sat only three miles from
the objective of Agira. Another push was planned by the 2nd Brigade
which eventually moved to within a mile of the town with the support
of harassing fire and concentrations by the artillery.86 A final push to
move into the city was planned with another fire plan that called for
nothing short of the complete destruction of Agira by indirect fire.
Three hundred rounds were stockpiled at each gun position and at
1200 hours the infantry on the outskirts of the town were ordered
to withdraw.87 Minutes before the shelling commenced, an errant
f o o , Captain G.E. Baxter from C Battery, 1st Field Regiment, r c h a
supporting the p p c l i , accidentally wandered into Agira only to find
that the enemy had departed. Fortunately for the town’s inhabitants,
who crowded around Captain Baxter to celebrate their liberation,
Agira was spared destruction.88
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REGALBUTO AND THE SALSO RIVER

The final chapter in the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery’s Sicilian
story centres on the assault of the town of Regalbuto, seven miles
east of Agira, tentatively scheduled for 30-31 July. W ith the 231st
(Malta) Brigade under command, 1st Canadian Division seized the
ridgeline south of the objective with a two-brigade attack conducted
by the 231st and 1st Canadian Brigades, supported by an immense
barrage of the three Canadian field regiments augmented by 165th
Field Regiment, r a and the 7th, 64th and 70th Medium Regiments,
r a .89 Once the ridgeline south of Regalbuto was secured, the division
prepared for a deliberate assault into the town behind another large
barrage. Fortunately, as in the case with Agira, forward patrols
found the town deserted of enemy and the fire plan was not required.
The division continued north along the Salso valley protecting
30th Corps’ left flank. Divisional combat continued for almost
another three weeks, but with the narrowing front created by the
massive Mount Etna, the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery was not
called upon to fire any large concentrations for the remainder of the
campaign. Tragically, on the last day of the campaign an American
B-25 Mitchell bomber was shot down and crashed into the 2nd Field
Regiment’s command post, causing 29 casualties.8
90

CONCLUSION

This article provides a brief overview of the efforts of the 1st
Canadian Divisional Artillery during the Sicilian Campaign. It
demonstrates that historians have yet to explore this vital chapter in
the campaign. Unfortunately, many of the existing histories on the
Sicilian campaign lack an in-depth investigation into the artillery’s
role within 1st Canadian Division. In this way, this work addresses
a topic that will help paint a fuller picture of Canada’s role in Italy.
This article demonstrates that the 1st Canadian Divisional
Artillery was thrust into a combat role with no combat experience,
having recently emerged from a significant reformation in artillery
organization and tactics. The Divisional Artillery conducted a
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torturous maritime approach to the area of operations, suffering a
severe loss of equipment and personnel to enemy action on the high
seas. Once the Division came into contact with a highly trained
enemy making the best use of Sicily’s topography, the artillery’s role
became paramount. The infantry no longer operated beyond the
range of the guns because their advance became bogged down by the
withering machine gun, mortar and artillery fire of the defenders. As
the Division ran into increasingly obstinate defences, the amount of
artillery that was required to dislodge the enemy grew exponentially.
However, there was still much to learn. Despite the impressive
amount of shelling conducted in the assault on Agira, the fire plan has
been correctly criticized for its lack of flexibility. Likewise, the vast
majority of rounds fired during the creeping barrages did not land
anywhere near the enemy and had no neutralizing effect whatsoever.
The evolution of fire support was a work in progress, and experience
in Sicily was an important step in the development of a very effective
artillery-based doctrine. As Terry Copp observes, “the artillery based
doctrine ... has been widely criticized by historians for its rigidity
... but it also suggests that the doctrine evolved out of the unique
situation confronting the Allies in 1943-44: the necessity of attacking
strong defensive positions with inferior armour and infantry weapons.”91
The gunners who fought their way through Sicily have a story that
requires greater attention. They faced many hardships throughout the
campaign but nonetheless persevered. In the end, they helped to develop
the war-winning artillery formula that would allow the Canadian Army
to successfully fight its way through Italy and Northwest Europe.
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